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The struggle over information in the territories occupied by Israel is an integral part 
of the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians. The dilemmas which Israeli policy 
makers must confront arise from the inherent inconsistency of a democratic country 
attempting to rule over a large, hostile population. The war over words is a part of a 
larger conflict over national legitimacy and both sides tend to define the clash as a 
zero-sum game (Benvenisti 1983).' 
The dilemmas faced by governments dlnring any occupation concern the costs and 
benefits of varying degrees of censorship. Questions of principle aside, leaders must 
decide whether such restrictions do more harm than good. Is political information 
more inflammatory when it is published in a newspaper or when it is passed through 
rumor, leaflets, or written on walls? Does freedom of expression encourage modem 
tion of extremism? Is it better to have foreign journalists bemoan the evils of censor 
ship or to report what is actually happening? None of the Israeli Ministers of Defen 
who have come and gone since the beginning of the occupation in 1967 have be 
able to offer a convincing answer to these questions, and the extent of informati 
control has varied considerably over the years. While some of these variations 
explained by differences in political outlook, most are better attributed to the 
of perceived threat. 
While the control of communication channels is always an important goal fo 
sides of a conflict, it becomes especially critical during times of crisis (Wol 
1988). The political impact of the news and information grows tremendously d 
times of crisis because of the prominence such stories are given and the large audi 
they attract. Political leaders from both sides find themselves sending messages n 
only to their own constituencies and to the other side, but to publics and 
makers around the world. At times of crisis, government policies inevitably 
more restrictive in the name of national security. Censorship becomes more 
sive, newspapers are closed, the press are often banned from areas of confl 
speeches, rallies, and demonstrations are either prohibited or severely restric 
normal times political resistance is handled with both "carrots and sticks," but d 
times of crisis govemments throw away the carrots and enlarge their sticks. 
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The ability of the government to control communication channels however, be- 
comes much more difficult in times of crisis. The mass media become more power- 
ful because of their increased audience, and are also more willing to take risks in 
defying the government because the story is more valuable. Alternative channels of 
communication also tend to flourish during a crisis, which makes the government's 
goal of control even more formidable. People are more likely to engage in political 
discussions, to spread rumors, and to distribute leaflets and posters. The growing need 
for information and guidance ensures a very wide and heterogeneous audience for such 
messages. 
This commentary will offer a description of Israel's attempt to resmct the flow of 
information in the West Bank and Gaza and the Palestinians' efforts to circumvent 
these restrictions. The first part will offer a general overview of the censorship policy 
in the temtories, while the second will show how each side adjusted to the uprising 
which began in December 1987. 
Censorship in the Occupied Territories 
The Israeli military censor takes responsibility for all publications which are produced 
either in Israel or in the occupied territories. As might be expected, however, the 
restrictions in the West Bank and Gaza are much stricter.2 Whereas Israeli newspapers 
are only required to submit materials which relate to security matters, the East 
Jerusalem papers are required to submit all materials, including crossword puzzles, 
advertisements, and photos. The decision of the military censor is final and there is 
no process of appeal. 
The Palestinian editors see their newspaper as a "mobilized" press whose primary 
urpose is to further the interests of the Palestinian struggle.3 Over the years the editors 
f these papers, most of which are published in East Jerusalem, have developed a work- 
mg relationship with the Israeli censor, and they usually know what kinds of materials 
are most likely to be rejected. The topics which are most frequently censored are those 
which serve the cause of national identity and mobilization (Benvenisti 1983, Rabihiya 
1985): references to the PLO or the Palestinian movement, to Israeli punitive 
measures in the territories, and references to resistance, terrorism, demonstrations and 
strikes, There is a constant game of "cat and mouse" which goes on between the cen- 
sor and the Palestinian newspapers (Benvenisti 1983, Rabihiya 1985). Theeditors are 
constantly testing the censor with ploys such as using the blank section of a crossword 
puzzle to spell out slogans, or by writing obituaries with clear political overtones. Al- 
though the newspapers are forbidden to leave space where material has been censored, 
the military censor eventually agreed to allow them to publish the words "we 
apologize" if an editorial was altered before publication.4 
The battle over information also takes place within a number of other arenas as 
ell. The Army spokesman's office is in charge of supplying information about Israeli 
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military matters to all Israeli and foreign correspondents in Israel. As the 
fice of public relations, it naturally attempts to use the information at its 
present Israel and the army in the most favorable light possible. Many forei 
reporters stationed in Israel also pay a fee to the Palestinian Press Service in order 
receive the opposing perspective about what is happening in the territories. The Pal 
tinian Press Service acts as a central clearing house for such information, and h 
wide network of sources within the territories and the Arab world. 
It is also important to emphasize the less formal means of communication whi 
have always served the Palestinian population living in the territories. The most 
portant of these is interpersonal communication, especially rumors. Indeed, there 
be little doubt that the initial riots which broke out in Gaza on December 7,1987 we 
started by just such a rumor. The rumor was that several Arabs had been intentio 
ly run down by an Israeli truck and that message spread through the adjoining refug 
camps and towns like wildfire. The uprising which began on that day continues at 
time of writing and the struggle over informational control has become much more i 
tense. 
Informational Control During the Uprising 
The uprising is, to a large extent a battle over world opinion and the media serve 
the central arena for that struggle. The Palestinians can not force the Israeli army 
of the territories; their major goal is to keep the Palestinian cause at the top of 
international agenda. The struggle over symbols, slogans, and stories is a decisi 
one, for both sides. 
It is important to remember that protest strategies which depend on the mass media 
are especially likely to be used in open societies such as Israel. The number of foreign 
correspondents stationed in Israel is among the highest in the world, and the territories 
remain, for the most part, completely open. Every attempt to close them, even for a 
few days, is met with protests from both inside and outside of Israel. Compared with 
other conflict areas, the "costs" of gathering the news in Israel are quite low and this 
leads to a tremendously disproportionate amount of news coverage. Israelis, for their 
part, often talk about the "price of democracy," and at times of crisis that price rises 
dramatically. 
The initial reaction of the Israeli authorities to the uprising was rather muted, in 
part because of the general consensus that it would quickly die out. As the disturban- 
ces continued to spread a great deal of blame for the problem was placed on the news 
media. The mass media were accused of provoking the riots and of ruining Israel's 
international image by one-sided reports about the events. The Minister of Defence 
was under a great deal of pressure to "do something" about the media, and at one point 
he complained about being one of the few Ministers in favor of keeping the territories 
open to the press (Azuli-Katz, 1988). 
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The East Jerusalem press, as might be expected, became much more aggressive 
in its writings: graphic articles about repression, the number of injured and killed, and 
the amount of suffering were all delivered to the censor. The censor also became much 
more forceful and began to reject a much higher proportion of the stories, even those 
which had already been published in the Israeli press. The game of cat and mouse be- 
came much fiercer. 
The restrictions on press f d o m  grew as the weeks of disturbances turned into 
months. The government attempted to gain control of both the internal communica- 
'on channels among the Palestinians themselves and of the flow of information to Is- 
rael and the rest of the Western world. The Palestinian Press service was closed, and 
at the time of this writing at least thirty four Arab journalists have been arrested for 
varying lengths of time. Local commanders were given the right to declare certain 
areas closed to the press, and in certain incidence reporters were requifed to take an 
escort from the Army spokesman's office.5 Two American reporters had their ac- 
creditation removed for filing stories without the censor's permission. One of the 
reporters describes the changing rules of the game as the scale of the crisis grew: 
Schematically, the media strictures form concentric circles. First, access to 
areas of tensions is barred; then, sources of second-hand information are 
silenced; and finally the finished news reports are subject to tightened 
censorship. Surrounding this system of restrictions like an outer ring is a 
public atmosphere of hostility to the press, encouraged from time to time by 
official statements directed against journalists (Greenberg 1988). 
These policies increased the risks and costs of getting the news. The Palestinian 
ess service, for example, had provided a beeper service which often directed 
reporters to particularriots, and an "escort service" of their own. After the service was 
closed, foreign reporters had to depend on much less sophisticated measures for cover- 
ing the breaking stories. Reporters also had to "sneak" into closed military areas, and 
while the physical danger of such acts was probably minimal, they could certainly be 
harassed, detained, or even arrested. 
Naturally there were quite a few stories about these restrictions in the Western 
ress, but officials in the Ministry of Defence had decided (probably correctly) that 
stories about censorship were much less damaging than pictures of soldiers quelling 
Palestinian riots. The success of these various efforts to control the Westem press 
remains an open question, in part because many of the measures were taken at a time 
when the news value of the riots had declined. 
It is fairly clear, however, that efforts to close the internal communication chan- 
nels of the Palestinians were not very successful. Political leaflets, for example, have 
become a central medium of mobilization. Whereas previous leaflets had carried 
mostly political attacks and slogans, the leaflets put out by the "United leadership of 
the Uprising" offer specific instructions for civil disobedience. They include 
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announcements about strikes and riots, calls for various sectors (e.g. policeman a 
civil servants) to resign, and directives about refusing to pay taxes. As each leafl 
published, it presents a direct challenge to the Israeli authorities, and forces are m 
lized and stationed in response to these calls for action. The Israeli authorities 
shut down several printing presses, but have been unable to stop new ones from sp 
ing up. 
Palestinian radio stations were set up by the PLO in northern Lebanon and of 
a good deal of moral support to the uprising. Active villages were singled out for pr 
and less active villages were "encouraged to join the struggle. There is good rea 
to believe that these broadcasts had a significant impact on the events themselv 
The Israeli authorities began jamming these broadcasts, and one station was event 
ly blown up in a raid by the Israeli air force. This military action offers some ind~ca- 
tions of the importance which was attributed to these broadcasts. 
The most common form of communication, however, remains word-of-mouth. 
News of injuries and deaths spread through the camps and cities very quickly, and this 
leads to more riots. Rumors, however, tend to lack in accuracy what they gain 
speed. As the Army spokesman put it "no one, it seems, dies a natural death any mo 
in the territorie~."~ Mosques also serve an important function in the exchange of i 
formation and are often used as bases for the organization and mobilization of protes 
The loudspeakers which are intended for calling the faithful to prayer are often us 
for more political types of messages as well. 
Some Lessons 
As stated, the struggle over political information is a struggle for power. 
such encounters, however, the weak can often win. There are at least two reasons 
this anomaly. First, it appears to be much more difficult (at least for democra 
regimes) to block channels of communication than it is for the weak to find alternativ 
ways to communicate. There are just too many holes in the dam and the authoriti 
have too few fingers. Secondly, the fight of the weak against the strong 
a powerful magnet for media attention, and it is the underdog who needs 
most. Israel suddenly finds her role being reversed and almost exclusively concern 
with "damage control. " 
The dilemmas which Israel must face are ones which confront many 0th 
democratic regimes during crisis. The major difference in the Middle East is the leng 
of the conflict. While most Western countries find themselves in crisis for only a bri 
time, the clock in Israel appears to be permanently stuck at the eleventh hour. Aresol 
tion of these dilemmas is predicated, first and foremost, on a resolution of the conflic 
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END NOTES 
This commentary is based in part on a larger study being carried out by the senior 
author on the effects of the mass media on political conflicts. The second author 
is employed as a journalist covering the occupied temtories for an Israeli 
newspaper. 
There are two separate administrative bodies which are responsible for governing 
the occupied temtories in the West Bank and Gaza (Benvenisti 1986). The 
military deals with all issues which are directly related to security and the civil 
administration deals with all other civic matters. The Minister of Defence holds 
political and administrative responsibility for both branches of government. The 
civil administration was created in November of 1981, and all of its employees 
are civilian, so the temtories are only partially under martial law. 
There is also a reasonable amount of evidence that these papers receive financial 
support from outside Arab sources such as the P.L.O. and Jordan. 
It is important to emphasize that despite these resmctions, &he Arab press has 
flourished under Israeli rule. Both the number of publications and their circulation 
has risen significantly. 
It is important to emphasize that there are genuine security problems when a large 
number of reporters come to cover a riot. The cameras do have a clear effect on 
riot behavior, and forces often have to be shifted to deal with the media crowd. 
This quote is taken from an interview by the senior author. 
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